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From Akron comes a question.  “Identical Constitutional Language: What Is a 
State Court to Do?” asks the Honorable Marianna Brown Bettman.2  Her dilemma is 
roughly this: if a clause of a state constitution is worded similarly to a clause in the 
federal Constitution, how can a state court develop constitutional law?  She sees this 
dilemma embodied in a series of opinions developing out of the criminal case of 
Robert Robinette.3  But in important respects, Judge Bettman’s question reflects a 
misunderstanding of the law.  This misunderstanding prevents her from identifying 
what is really at stake in cases like the one she describes. 
Specifically, Judge Bettman seems to have misread Michigan v. Long.4  The 
Long Court laid out a clear test for determining the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction over state cases where the grounds—federal or state—of the state court’s 
decision are ambiguous.  The Supreme Court correctly applied this test in Robinette.  
Judge Bettman’s conclusion that the Supreme Court was improperly stretching its 
jurisdiction to infringe on Ohio’s constitutional territory is therefore incorrect. 
This error prevents Judge Bettman from squarely addressing the question of 
where state supreme court justices should rest their judgments when they might do so 
upon either the federal or the state constitution, or both.  This is an important 
question raised by Long’s clear statement doctrine, but it has not been thoroughly 
considered.5  Although there are good reasons for the hypothetical state supreme 
                                                                
1Law clerk to the Honorable Susan J. Dlott, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio; J.D., Harvard Law School, 2000; B.A., Rice University, 1997.  I am particularly grateful 
to Richard Fallon for helping me to clarify my argument in Part III.  Thanks also to Beth 
Collins, Chris Giampapa, and Jason Linder for their comments on earlier drafts of this Reply. 
2Marianna Brown Bettman, Identical Constitutional Language: What Is a State Court to 
Do? The Ohio Case of State v. Robinette, 32 AKRON L. REV. 657 (1999). 
3See State v. Robinette, No. 14074, 1994 WL 147806, at *1 (Ohio App. Apr. 15, 1994); 
State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1995); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996); State 
v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997). 
4463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
5For a summary of the literature dealing with Judge Bettman’s concern, see Donna M. 
Nakagiri, Developing State Constitutional Jurisprudence after Michigan v. Long: Suggestions 
for Opinion Writing and Systemic Change, 1998 DET. C.L. REV. 807.  This rather curious 
article provides a catalog of approaches for state court judges to use to avoid Supreme Court 
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court justice to rest her decision on the state constitution alone, I will argue that from 
a global perspective, the country’s legal system might be best served by resting on 
both the federal and state constitutions. 
After briefly recounting the story of the Robinette case’s journey through the 
state legal system to the federal one and back again, I will present Judge Bettman’s 
analysis and show how she errs.  Then I will consider the deeper question presented 
by a correct understanding of Supreme Court jurisdiction over state court judgments. 
I.  THE FACTS AND DISPOSITION OF ROBINETTE 
Robert Robinette was driving about twenty-five miles per hour over the speed 
limit when county Sheriff’s Deputy Roger Newsome stopped him.  Newsome, on 
drug interdiction patrol at the time, was stopping speeders at that location.  Before 
speaking with Robinette, Newsome had decided to issue only a warning, which was 
his routine practice.  Newsome requested and received Robinette’s driver’s license.  
He returned to his own vehicle to check the license and found no violations.  He then 
returned to Robinette’s vehicle and asked him to step out of the car and to its rear.  
Robinette complied.  Newsome turned on a video camera, issued a warning to 
Robinette, and returned his driver’s license. 
Then Newsome said, “One question before you get gone [sic]: are you carrying 
any illegal contraband in your car?  Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like 
that?”6  This procedure was also standard practice for Newsome.  Robinette 
answered in the negative.  Newsome asked whether he could search the car.  
Robinette, not feeling at liberty to refuse, consented.  The ensuing search by 
Newsome uncovered certain controlled substances, which formed the basis for 
Robinette’s arrest and charge for violating Ohio’s anti-drug abuse law. 
At trial Robinette’s motion to suppress the evidence discovered by Newsome’s 
search was denied, and he was convicted.  But the court of appeals reversed his 
conviction, ruling that the trial court’s failure to suppress was error.  The court 
reasoned that Newsome’s search constituted an unlawful detention since, after he 
had issued the warning for speeding, Newsome had no “reasonable and articulable 
suspicion”7 of any criminal activity.  Whether Robinette consented to the search was 
therefore immaterial. 
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.8  Justice Pfeifer’s majority opinion discussed 
the justification required for any investigative stop under the Fourth Amendment.  
Opening with language from the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Terry v. 
Ohio,9 Justice Pfeifer continued by discussing State v. Chatton,10 the principal Ohio 
case construing the Fourth Amendment in the context of investigative stops.  The 
court proceeded to consider the facts of the instant case in light of Supreme Court 
                                                          
review, yet it acknowledges that the plain statement discussed in Long will always accomplish 
this purpose.  See id. at 837.  It does not, however, consider whether state judges employing 
Long’s rule should also discuss federal law. 
6Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 696. 
7Robinette, 1994 WL 147806 at *2. 
8Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 695. 
9392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
10463 N.E.2d 1237 (Ohio 1984). 
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precedents defining consensual encounters between citizens and police, and it 
concluded that a bright line rule was necessary.  It stated this rule in its syllabus: 
The right, guaranteed by the federal and Ohio Constitutions, to be secure 
in one’s person and property requires that citizens stopped for traffic 
offenses be clearly informed by the detaining officer when they are free to 
go after a valid detention, before an officer attempts to engage in a 
consensual interrogation.  Any attempt at consensual interrogation must 
be preceded by the phrase “At this time you legally are free to go” or by 
words of similar import.11 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari12 and reversed.13  Writing for 
a seven-member majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist first disposed of Robinette’s 
claim that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the Ohio decision rested on adequate 
and independent state grounds.  Applying Long, the Court correctly determined that 
“the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground [was] not clear,”14 
so it was proper for the Court to take jurisdiction.  Next, the Court rejected the bright 
line test of the Ohio Supreme Court as incommensurate with Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  Justice Ginsburg concurred that Supreme Court jurisdiction was 
proper but wrote separately to point out that the Ohio Supreme Court could still 
choose to reaffirm its holding, so long as it clearly stated that it was relying on the 
state constitution.15 
The Ohio Supreme Court did not choose this course.  Instead, it announced that 
where, as here, “the provisions are similar and no persuasive reason for a differing 
interpretation is presented, this court has determined that protections afforded by 
Ohio’s Constitution are coextensive with those provided by the United States 
Constitution.”16  Then it applied the Supreme Court’s totality-of-the-circumstances 
test to the facts before it and concluded that Newsome’s detention of Robinette failed 
that standard, also, reaffirming the court of appeals’ judgment. 
II.  EXERCISING FEDERAL JURISDICTION UNDER MICHIGAN V. LONG 
Judge Bettman directs much of her disapproval toward the United States 
Supreme Court’s exercise of jurisdiction.  The thrust of her argument is that the Ohio 
Supreme Court’s initial disposition of Robinette relied on adequate and independent 
state law grounds.  Therefore, when the federal Court accepted jurisdiction, it 
improperly infringed on Ohio’s constitutional terrain.  The basis for her assertion is 
that portion of the syllabus quoted above.  In her article Judge Bettman italicizes 
federal and Ohio Constitutions in the first sentence of the quoted paragraph to 
emphasize her view that the decision stood on independent state law.  “Of 
                                                                
11Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 696. 
12See Ohio v. Robinette, 516 U.S. 1157 (1996). 
13See Robinette, 519 U.S. 33. 
14Id. at 37 (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1040-41). 
15See id. at 44-45 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
16Robinette, 685 N.E.2d at 766. 
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significance to this article,” she points out, “is the stated reliance in the second 
paragraph of the syllabus on both the federal and state constitutions.”17 
After briefly discussing the relevant rule of Michigan v. Long,18 Judge Bettman 
proceeds to misapply it.  She complains that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority 
opinion “gave short shrift to the ‘independent state grounds’ alleged.”19  Then she 
concludes with disapproval bordering on sarcasm: “In short, boldly saying that a case 
is decided on an independent state ground will not necessarily make it so.”20  In fact, 
precisely the opposite is true.  Boldly saying that a case is decided on an independent 
state ground will make it so.  Therefore, much of Judge Bettman’s objection to 
Robinette is based on a misunderstanding of the law. 
A cursory review of Long should clarify.  It is axiomatic that the federal courts 
have no power to change or even review a state’s construction of its own common or 
constitutional law.21  And it has long been settled that the Supreme Court will not 
accept jurisdiction to review a case that has been decided on adequate and 
independent state law grounds, even when the case also involves a federal question.22  
These unquestioned principles ought to satisfy Judge Bettman.  But Long asked a 
different question. 
If the state court does not explicitly say so, how should the Court ascertain 
whether state law furnishes adequate and independent grounds for the decision?  
There are four possible responses to this dilemma.  First, the Court could examine 
the relevant state law and form its own conclusion about its adequacy for the 
decision.  Second, it could vacate the decision and ask the state court specifically.  
Third, it could assume that it has no jurisdiction.  Or fourth, it could assume that it 
has jurisdiction.  In Long, the Court adopted the fourth option.  Writing for the 
majority, Justice O’Connor justified this rule in terms of efficiency, uniformity, and 
respect for state courts.  In Long and henceforward, if state law grounds are 
adequate, the state court must say so.  In Long itself the state court did not say so, 
and it decided the Fourth Amendment question incorrectly.  Thus, the Supreme 
Court accepted jurisdiction and reversed. 
One might certainly criticize the application of the Long rule to Long itself.  Prior 
to Justice O’Connor’s opinion, state courts had no way of knowing that an explicit 
statement was required to preclude federal review.  Therefore, according to the 
values that Justice O’Connor articulated to support the rule, it seems that vacating 
                                                                
17Bettman, supra note 2, at 659. 
18The correct identification of the Long rule prompts two readings of Judge Bettman’s 
article that would not be subject to the present critique.  First, she might have been suggesting 
that the Supreme Court should have overruled Long.  Second, she might have been suggesting 
that, given Long’s plain statement rule, the Ohio syllabus should have satisfied it.  One could 
engage each of these arguments on its merits, but I will not do so here because I do not think 
that they are the most natural readings of Judge Bettman’s article. 
19Id. at 661. 
20Id. 
21See Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). 
22See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss3/4
2000] DECIDE THE LAW, CLEARLY―A REPLY TO JUDGE BETTMAN 473 
and remanding would have better furthered federal respect for state courts.23  For all 
subsequent cases, however, Long clearly accomplishes its purposes. 
This is why Judge Bettman’s objection is both puzzling and wrong.  
Jurisdictionally, Robinette presented precisely the situation decided by Long.  In 
both, the state court said, without more, that it was relying on both the federal and 
state constitutions.  Does this mean that reliance on the state constitution is sufficient 
to decide the case?  Trying to answer that question in Robinette, one confronts the 
paradigmatic ambiguity resolved by Long.  As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her 
Robinette concurrence, duly noted by Judge Bettman, if the Ohio Supreme Court 
really believed its decision to be based on adequate and independent state 
constitutional grounds, all it had to do was add to its opinion a sentence stating so 
explicitly.  If it had done so, the Supreme Court would not have accepted 
jurisdiction.  Thus, while the Court’s substantive views about the Fourth Amendment 
in recent cases like Robinette might well be open to criticism.24  Its exercise of 
jurisdiction should be decidedly non-controversial. 
The challenge of Robinette identified by Judge Bettman therefore has, from a 
federal perspective, a mundane answer.  She argues, 
In this era of “new” states’ rights, the challenge for the states will be how 
to satisfy the “independent state ground” requirement of Michigan v. 
Long, where the language of state and federal constitutional provisions is 
identical, and the state does not yet have a body of state precedent on 
which to draw.25 
To meet the challenge, all a state court need do is engage in regular legal 
analysis, and then conclude its opinion by stating, “This decision rests on adequate 
and independent state law grounds.” 
It is difficult to charitably reformulate this supposed challenge.  I strongly suspect 
that Judge Bettman wants Ohio to interpret its state constitution so that it provides 
“more” protection to the individual against state action than does the federal 
constitution.  No one disputes a state can plausibly read its constitution in this way,26 
                                                                
23One commentator has insisted that Long is a rule that is disrespectful of state judges in 
subsequent cases as well.  See Eric B. Schnurer, The Inadequate and Dependent “Adequate 
and Independent State Grounds” Doctrine, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 371, 379 (1991) 
(“presumption condescends to state judges”). 
24For criticism of the Court’s recent Fourth Amendment cases generally, see David A. 
Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and 
Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997).  Another strong critique 
of Supreme Court jurisprudence in this area is David O. Markus, Whren v. United States: A 
Pretext to Subvert the Fourth Amendment, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 91 (1998).  For an 
argument that even Ohio’s bright line test did not go far enough in protecting individual rights, 
see Christo Lassiter, Eliminating Consent from the Lexicon of Traffic Stop Interrogations, 27 
CAP. U. L. REV. 79 (1998). 
25Bettman, supra note 2, at 663. 
26In fact, many have celebrated the practice.  See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of 
Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986).  For a good argument that state courts should rely on state 
constitutions in dealing with constitutional claims to various aspects of welfare, see Helen 
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but Ohio has declined to do so.  After remand from the United States Supreme Court, 
the Ohio Supreme Court in Robinette stated that “this court has determined that 
protections afforded by Ohio’s Constitution are coextensive with those provided by 
the United States Constitution.”27  Thus, even if there is a body of state precedent on 
which a state court might draw, so long as the state and federal constitutional 
provisions are virtually identical, Ohio will read its state constitutional provision to 
have the same meaning as its federal equivalent. 
III.  DECISIONAL ORDER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FIDELITY 
Because her understanding of the relevance of Long to Robinette was incorrect, 
Judge Bettman did not recognize the interesting question that the Long rule presents 
for state judges.  That is, on which grounds should a state court judge rest a decision 
when more than one option is plausible?  Exploration of this question moves us 
beyond a critique of Judge Bettman’s argument.  The Long rule allows a state 
supreme court, in certain circumstances, to rule on the federal Constitution without 
the ruling being subject to Supreme Court review.  It follows from the critique, 
however, since such a question arises only if one recognizes that the Long rule 
allows a state supreme court, in certain circumstances, to rule on the federal 
Constitution without the ruling being subject to Supreme Court review.  If the state 
court could not bar federal review with a plain statement of adequate and 
independent state law grounds, as Judge Bettman suggests, a state court judge will 
have no need to consider the question.  To grasp the contours of the problem, 
imagine a state supreme court justice faced with a case in which a litigant has a valid 
claim of constitutional right that the justice could uphold on (1) state constitutional 
grounds alone, (2) federal constitutional grounds alone, or (3) both state and federal 
constitutional grounds, making clear in the opinion that the state ground is adequate 
and independent.  Which course should the justice take? 
Each choice differently affects Supreme Court jurisdiction over the decision.  If 
the justice chooses the first option, there will be no Supreme Court review.  The 
second option will permit review.  And under Long, the third option, like the first, 
will prohibit review.  If the justice wants her disposition of the case to be final, she 
should choose the first or third option, since the second option will allow a different 
court to review the judgment.  Assume, however, that she truly believes the 
constitutional claim to be valid under both the state and federal constitutions.  To 
articulate such a view, she must choose option three.  This is precisely the course she 
should take.  Judges ought to say what the law is; it behooves the judicial function to 
act on sincerely held beliefs about the law, not on strategic considerations of insuring 
the finality of a judgment.  Our justice could rest her decision on state constitutional 
grounds alone, knowing that this would preclude Supreme Court review, and be 
pleased that the case was rightly decided in the final analysis.  But if the federal 
Constitution also yields the same result, shouldn’t the justice say that as well? 
Conventional institutional arguments counsel against an affirmative answer.  The 
difficulty with deciding the case on both state and federal constitutional grounds, 
while stating explicitly that the state ground is adequate and independent, is that it 
                                                          
Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 1132 (1999). 
27Robinette, 685 N.E.2d at 766. 
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allows the state court to make a final, unreviewable ruling on the meaning of the 
federal Constitution.  This poses no practical problem—unless the state supreme 
court and the federal Supreme Court have different understandings of the federal 
Constitution.  In that case, the state supreme court would be in the position of 
pronouncing a view of the Constitution that the federal Supreme Court would reverse 
as error if it had jurisdiction.  But since the state decision stated that the state ground 
was adequate and independent, no federal review is possible. 
One might argue that we should take a dim view of such a state of affairs.  
Surely, this argument proceeds, for the highest state court to say the Constitution 
means one thing, while the Supreme Court says it means another, would confuse the 
public and undermine its confidence in the judiciary and perhaps the rule of law 
itself.  As a practical matter, it might lead citizens to believe that one can 
successfully assert federal constitutional claims in federal court, based on the state 
court’s exposition of its meaning.  Since state court rulings on the Constitution do 
not bind federal courts, and since the Supreme Court can ultimately review all 
federal court decisions, litigants would lose these claims, resulting in yet more 
confusion. 
These worries are not insubstantial.  Indeed, it seems clear that if Congress 
preferred to avoid these difficulties by mandating that state courts take the first 
course instead (sticking to state law grounds alone when possible), it could do so 
under Article III and the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Yet, the above probably 
overstates concerns over confusion and lost confidence.  First, the public’s 
confidence in the judiciary would probably not be significantly undermined by two 
courts reading the same Constitution two different ways.  This happens all the time; 
it is the definition of a circuit split.  And when the Supreme Court denies certiorari, 
those decisions are final.  Second, it seems unlikely that litigants would actually seek 
to rely at their peril on state court interpretation of the Constitution in federal court.  
Knowing the controlling precedent of the specific forum for one’s case is an 
absolutely basic requirement for the practicing lawyer. 
In addition, I think other global considerations should lead us to endorse the state 
supreme court’s unreviewable expounding on the Constitution.  Here again I am 
interested in the case in which a state supreme court thinks the Constitution dictates 
one result, while the federal Supreme Court would reach the opposite conclusion.28  
In what sense would the state court be getting the law wrong?  Isn’t it equally 
possible that the state court is getting the Constitution right, while the Supreme Court 
is in error?  The query requires some thought.  One might be tempted to argue that 
the proposition is outrageous; the Constitution means what the Supreme Court says it 
                                                                
28Of course, such a case exists squarely in the realm of the thought experiment.  For any 
case over which the Supreme Court may and does exercise jurisdiction, principles of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel require any state court that subsequently deals with the case to 
respect its judgment.  For any case (like the ones with which we are here concerned) in which 
the state supreme court rules on the state and federal constitutions and includes a plain 
statement of adequate and independent state law grounds, the Supreme Court will not review 
the case, and we will never know in fact whether the Supreme Court disagrees with the state 
court’s understanding of the federal Constitution.  Consider Robinette in this regard.  If the 
Ohio Supreme Court had believed that the state constitution and the federal one dictated 
independent but identical results, it could have employed a plain statement to bar federal 
review.  In that scenario, we would never know whether the Supreme Court agreed or not. 
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does.  From a Holmesian, legal realist perspective, this is true, but this should not 
end our inquiry.  I doubt anyone will be heard to argue that the Supreme Court has 
never erred in its interpretation of the Constitution.  Indeed, dredging up the specter 
of Lochner29 is a familiar rhetorical tack for almost all the Justices, and they do not 
hesitate to tell us now that “we think Plessy was wrong the day it was decided.”30 
Assuming, then, that getting the Constitution right should be the first goal of 
constitutional adjudication,31 and that the Supreme Court sometimes gets it wrong, 
we should ask which of the three options available to our hypothetical state supreme 
court justice will best further correct readings of the Constitution.  I think it is the 
third option.  But this is not the case because of substantive decisions.  If the 
Supreme Court at a particular time interprets a provision of the Constitution 
incorrectly and a state supreme court gets the reading right, that is one more correct 
reading than if the state court had rested its judgment on state grounds alone.  But 
this substantive argument goes nowhere quickly, since it is at least as likely that the 
Supreme Court will be right on any particular question, and the state court wrong.  
Instead, we should consider the process by which constitutional decisions are made. 
Faithful readings of the Constitution cannot remain static.  If a constitutional 
provision means one thing in a certain context, when the context changes, the 
reading must also change to preserve the same meaning.  The full implications of this 
basic insight have been most thoroughly investigated by Professor Lawrence 
Lessig.32  As he has argued in detail, to determine whether a reading of the 
Constitution is one of fidelity, one must be sensitive to changes in foreground and 
background contexts.  In addition, however, we should recognize that judges can 
never read the Constitution to mean something that we all know is false.  That is, 
constitutional adjudication is subject to constraints of contestability.33  Contextual 
transition to and from incontestability has many different, relevant permutations, but 
one basic point is that judges will shy away from otherwise faithful readings of the 
Constitution because the judicial institution, in order to avoid seeming political–or 
                                                                
29Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down as unconstitutional New 
York’s maximum hour law for bakers).  For an example of the rhetorical invocation of 
Lochnerian error, see Justice Souter’s dissent in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 165 
(1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (decrying the majority’s resort to “textually unwarranted 
common-law rules, for it was just this practice in the century's early decades that brought this 
Court to the nadir of competence that we identify with Lochner v. New York”). 
30Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992). 
31I recognize that such an assumption is not incontestable.  For the view that a 
constitutional theory’s “fit” with the text itself does not of its own force justify the theory, see 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535 (1999).  
Without wishing here to engage Professor Fallon’s arguments, I think it sufficient for present 
purposes to note the widespread and persistent belief that fidelity to the Constitution is an 
adjudicatory value of the first order. 
32For his most important single work on the subject, see Lawrence Lessig, Understanding 
Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995). 
33On the particular relevance of incontestability/contestability, and its relation to the 
fact/value distinction, see Lawrence Lessig, The Puzzling Persistence of Bellbottom Theory: 
What a Constitutional Theory Should Be, 85 GEO. L.J. 1837 (1997). 
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worse, dictatorial–abhors itself changing the contestability of a relevant context.  
Professor Lessig has called this “the Frankfurter constraint.”34 
What is contestable, however, may be quite different at the state and national 
levels.  Citizens of one state might be willing to consider an argument that the rest of 
the nation would never hear of.  For example, think of how a presidential candidate 
could carry the majority of one state though she is far behind in national polls.  A 
state court may read the Constitution unencumbered by the Frankfurter constraint 
that would attend the Supreme Court’s reading of the same clause, because a state 
may be open to arguments or understandings to which the nation as a whole is not.  
Once a state court so decides, however, if its reading stands, the ensuing national 
dialogue may hasten a shift in the nation’s receptivity to the arguments or 
understandings relied on by the state supreme court.  From the global perspective of 
American constitutional law, such a system would facilitate faithful Supreme Court 
readings of the Constitution, because it would render institutional constraints of 
contextual contestability more subject to change than otherwise.  From this global 
perspective, then, we should favor the state supreme court justice basing her decision 
on state and federal constitutional grounds, while making clear that the state ground 
is adequate and independent. 
Though this claim may strike some as unconventional, it is less controversial than 
on first appearance, since the only cases considered are the limited category of cases 
in which a state court could, in good conscience, rest its decision on either the state 
or federal constitutions, or both.  Since I have elaborated no particular theory of 
constitutional interpretation or the role of precedent, one might push the argument to 
its logical extreme by asking whether it authorizes a state court to ignore Supreme 
Court precedent with which it disagrees.  In fact, however, state courts may always 
pursue this tack, but unless there is an adequate and independent state law ground, 
the Supreme Court may accept jurisdiction and reverse the decision.  In terms of 
adjudication, then, it makes no difference whether the state court explicitly disagrees 
with the Supreme Court, but the global benefits I have described will inhere only if 
the state court explains its decision openly and honestly.  One need not push the 
argument so far, however, for it seems more likely that the state court would merely 
interpret Supreme Court precedent differently than would the Court itself.  This is 
effectively the situation presented by Robinette, had the Ohio Supreme Court 
believed that the state and federal constitutions independently dictated the same 
result. 
One would be foolish to argue that differential contestability justifies precluding 
Supreme Court review of all state court rulings on federal law.  Not only would the 
argument run counter to the Constitution’s text, but also the cost, in evisceration of 
federal power, would be enormous, which is why this theory of federal review was 
properly rejected over 180 years ago.35  But in the particular category of cases with 
which we have been concerned here, the cost is greatly reduced because, by 
definition, the outcome of the case does not turn on the federal Constitution.  State 
constitutional law alone would be sufficient. 
                                                                
34Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Federalism’s Text, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1218, 1221 
(1998). 
35See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Which course should a state supreme court justice take when she could, in good 
conscience:  decide a claim on the state constitution alone; the federal Constitution 
alone, or both, making clear that the state ground is adequate and independent?  A 
global interest in constitutional fidelity counsels for the third choice.  This is, 
however, a question that Judge Bettman never reaches because, in misreading Long, 
she erroneously concludes that a state supreme court that explicitly rests its judgment 
on independent state and federal constitutional grounds cannot preclude Supreme 
Court review.  Since Long tells us precisely the opposite, the proper answer to Judge 
Bettman’s question—identical constitutional language: what is a state court to do?—
is to decide the law, clearly. 
 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss3/4
